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Abstract 
This thesis studies how profitability in both emerging and advanced economies is 
affected by market structure in a financial crisis. The country sample from Mirzaei, 
Moore, & Liu (2013) is used with a similar methodology, with the distinct difference 
of using all banks rather than simply active banks, to enable a comparison to the time 
period 1999-2008. A sample of 1328 banks in 40 countries, 17 advanced countries 
and 23 emerging countries, from 2005-2014 is used with 934 banks from advanced 
countries and 394 banks from emerging countries.  
 
None of the market power hypotheses, the relative-market-power hypothesis nor the 
structure-conduct-performance hypothesis, are found to be significant for the crisis 
period 2008-2010. Instead in advanced economies market concentration is a negative 
determinant of profits in the financial crisis period 2008-2010, indicating that a high 
market concentration reduces stability and profitability for the banking sector in 
advanced economies. In contrast, emerging economies find market concentration as a 
positive determinant of profitability and market share of the bank as negative. The 
banks in a concentrated market seem to be able to perform better, but the largest 
banks are more negatively affected by the financial crisis, resulting in lower 
profitability. The result of both economies for the entire sample period 2005-2014 is 
equivalent to the market structure-profit relationship found in emerging economies 
during the financial crisis period. No signs are found of a market structure and 
profitability relationship after the crisis, which indicate that something other than 
market structure mainly affects profitability today. A survivorship bias is present 
when only including active banks, which speaks for the importance of not excluding 
data in market structure-profit research.  
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1. Introduction  
1.1. Background 
The performance of the banking sector is crucial for a country’s stability and growth, 
and yet the configuration of the banking sector is different in each market. A country 
like Sweden has over 85 percent in four-firm concentration1, whereas Germany has a 
significantly lower concentration at 47 percent (Table 19). In 2008, the subprime 
crisis2 hit and bank profitability was reduced significantly, with over 250 banks 
declaring bankruptcy during the financial crisis period 2008-2010 in the U.S. alone 
(Antoniades, 2015). In a way the financial crisis showed which banks were safe and 
which were not. The outcome of the crisis motivated this thesis to further look into 
which banks performed better under the financial crisis and the type of market those 
banks were active in. 
 
The relationship between the market structure in a country’s banking sector, measured 
in market share and market concentration, and bank performance have been 
previously studied. The two variables have found to have a positive relationship when 
performed on banks according to other studies (Berger, 1995). The terminology 
market power is often used to explain how firms with high market share are able to be 
"price makers", and have large influence on the sector in which it participates. The 
two most recognized market power theories are the structure-conduct-performance 
(SCP) paradigm and the relative-market-power (RMP) paradigm. The first determine 
how much of the profitability that can be attributed to monopolistic behavior of the 
bank, and the second the extent that it can be credited to the bank’s ability to use their 
market power to earn profits. 
 
Mirzaei, Moore, & Liu (2013) analyze the effect of market structure on profitability 
and stability between the years 1999-2008 on emerging and advanced economies. 
More specifically by studying the regions Western Europe, Eastern Europe, and the 
Middle East. This thesis uses the same country sample and replicates their 
                                                
1 A market concentration measurement which measures the fraction of bank assets held by the four 
largest banks in a country 
2 The financial crisis that started in 2008 is refered to as the subprime crisis due to the subprime 
mortgage loans that are seen as the trigger that started the financial crisis 
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methodology to a large degree. Their study is subject to a survivorship bias, which 
could be problematic because they only capture the good performing banks rather 
than the whole banking sector. The existing literature is very heavy on highly 
profitable banking periods, but the market structure and profitability relationship is 
not extensively researched in a financial crisis period. To this thesis’ knowledge the 
paper is the first to examine the differences between the relationship in a highly 
profitable banking period to a period of low profitability with the same country 
sample and methodology. 
 
1.2. Research question  
The research question posed in this thesis is whether the market structure in the 
banking industry positively or negatively affects individual bank profitability during a 
financial crisis in advanced and emerging economies. Furthermore, conclude if any of 
the two market-power hypotheses, structure-conduct-performance (SCP) or relative-
market-power (RMP), hold in a crisis. The question also entails if there are potential 
deviations to the findings of Mirzaei, Moore, & Liu (2013. Lastly, investigate how 
profitability and market structure are related after the financial crisis. 
 
1.3. Purpose 
The aim of this paper is to examine the relationship between the market structure and 
profitability by using data on individual banks in both advanced economies and 
emerging economies. The thesis contributes to the market structure and profitability 
relationship research by using a different approach; more precisely study the 
relationship during a crisis period, and include all banks rather than just the active 
banks. Furthermore, the paper investigates if profitability is explained by any of the 
current market-power hypotheses. Thus study how significant market concentration or 
market share affects bank profitability, and how it differs between advanced 
economies and emerging economies. More specifically, assess if the larger or smaller 
banks, in terms of market share, are able to benefit from a concentrated banking 
sector. Also determine if bank size affects profitability in a financial crisis. 
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The findings of the thesis are of interest for both regulators and institutional investors. 
The regulators could benefit from the findings of the study, by receiving information 
on whether antitrust regulation should be more or less regulated in the banking sector. 
In addition, the market structure and profitability relationship could give institutional 
investors insight in which market is able to generate highest profit in a crisis. 
1.4. Delimitations 
The time period for the assessment is from 2005 to 2014, in pursuance of capturing 
the effect of the years before and after the subprime crisis. The time period is in 
accordance of the availability of data since the chosen span is the only fully captured 
crisis in the database. When going further back in time less bank data is accessible, 
which could make the findings less reliable. 
 
Banks are only included from 40 countries in the regions of Western Europe, Eastern 
Europe, and Middle East. The main reason is to enable a comparsion to the results of 
Mirzaei, Moore, & Liu (2013). Data on the banks is processed mainly from 
Bankscope; this can make it hard to get exactly all the available data since some 
information could be missing from the database. In addition, these inaccurate or 
missing values can impact the specific variables, but also the market share and market 
concentration calculations.  
 
A recent trend among research is to test Berger’s efficiency hypothesis in different 
countries or regions. The relationship is not tested in this thesis, but the model 
controls for efficiency indirectly through overheads to assets, cost to income, and 
bank size. The efficiency-structure relationship requires using stochastic frontier 
analysis (SFA) and the data envelopment analysis (DEA), which would shift the focus 
of this thesis. In addition, calculating the efficiency variables for 40 countries would 
require more resources to finish in the limited time period available for this thesis. 
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2. Theoretical Framework 
2.1. Market power and efficiency theory 
In market structure research there are two main views, market power and efficency, 
which provide different explanations for the market structure-bank profitabilty 
relationship.  
 
2.1.1. Market power theory 
The first out of the two market-power hypothesis, structure-conduct-performance 
(SCP) hypothesis, explains that in a more concentrated market, prices are set less 
favorable to consumers, due to imperfectly competitive markets, resulting in low rates 
of deposits and higher loan rates (Bourke, 1989). The second theory, relative-market-
power (RMP) hypothesis, claims that firms with large market share3 and well-
differentiated products are able to exercise their market power and earn supernormal 
profit (Shepherd, 1982). This implying that only large banks can affect prices and 
thereby achieve higher profits (Tregenna, 2009). The two hypotheses require market 
concentration, measured by Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) or four-firm 
concentration, and market share in order to be tested. The market-power hypotheses 
are mutually exclusive, the relative-market-power (RMP) hypothesis holds if market 
share is positive and significant and market concentration is not, and the structure-
conduct-performance (SCP) hypothesis is accepted if market concentration is positive 
and significant while market share is not. 
 
2.1.2. Efficiency theory 
Berger believes that profitability is not only driven by market power but also 
efficiency. The efficient structure stresses the importance of size on profits because 
they are scale dependent. More precise, X-efficiency argues that firms with superior 
management or production technologies have lower costs and therefore higher profits 
(Berger, 1995). While scale-efficiency justifies that firms with equally good 
management and technology, some firms can still produce at more efficient scales 
than others, and consequently, have lower unit costs and higher unit profits (Berger, 
                                                
3 Market share is the percetage of the individual firm's assets out of the total assets within the country's 
banking sector. 
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1995). In Berger’s (1995) research he gathers support for the relative-market-power 
(RMP) hypothesis and some support for the X-efficiency hypothesis.  
Studying the market structure-profit relationship without including the efficiency 
variable can lead to incorrectly supporting the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) 
hypothesis and relative-market-power (RMP) hypothesis since efficiency can be a 
correlation with both price and structure. This is because large firms with high market 
share often have lower marginal cost, giving support for X-efficiency hypothesis (Yu 
et al., 2007). Consequently, efficiency variables are more frequently used in empirical 
studies studying the market structure- profitability relationship align with Berger’s 
(1995) research.  
2.2. Empirical studies 
The determinants of bank profitability have historically been extensively researched. 
Early research focus on the market structure-profit relationship on multinational 
markets, Bourke (1989) studies Europe, North America, and Australia, and Molyneux 
& Thornton (1992) focus entirely on Europe. They both find the structure-conduct-
performance to be positive and significant. Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven and Levine 
(2004) look at how bank regulations, market structure, and national institutions affect 
banks net interest margins and overhead costs, and find that a country with high 
inflation often have wider margin and greater returns. Athanasoglou, Brissimis, & 
Delis (2008) look at single country level, more specifically study Greece 
macroeconomic determinants of bank profitability, and find GDP growth to have a 
positive relationship with profitability. 
 
Recently there is a trend of more focus towards emerging economies. Ben- Khadiris 
(2009) look into Islamic bank profitability in the MENA region4, and find a positive 
relationship between structure and profits of the banking industry. The following two 
studies, Guillén, Rengifo, & Ozsoz (2014) in Latin America, and Garza-Garcia (2012) 
on country level in Mexico, attempt to answer if profitability is a result of lower 
efficiency or non- competitive market conditions. The first conclude that the efficient 
structure hypothesis holds, and the later find support for the relative-market-power 
hypothesis, but not the efficient structure hypothesis. 
                                                
4 The MENA region is referring to the Middle East & North Africa region 
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Mirzaei, Moore, & Liu (2013) examine market structure’s affect on banks’ 
profitability and stability in advanced- and emerging economies. Their study 
investigates this phenomenon during the pre-crisis period, 1999 to 2008, which they 
refer to as the “fat banking years” because of the large profits in the banking sector. 
The study concludes market share to be positive and significant, and five-firm 
concentration to be non-significant in advanced economies, providing support for the 
relative-market-power hypothesis. In emerging economies, they find four-firm 
concentration to be negative and significant in the working paper and five-firm 
concentration to be negative, but non-significant in their published paper. Thereby, 
showing no support of neither the relative-market-power hypothesis nor the structure-
conduct-performance hypothesis in emerging economies. They also find higher 
interest rate spreads to increase profitability and stability for both types of economies. 
The deviation of the result, a non-significant negative market concentration 
coefficient rather than a significant, can likely be attributed to using five-firm 
concentration instead of four-firm concentration. Mirzaei, Moore, and Liu do not 
justify changing it to five-firm concentration in their published paper. Another 
questionable decision is their choice to only include active banks. When excluding 
banks that failed during the time period, a survivorship bias might be present, which 
can make the results unreliable. 
 
Tregenna (2009) writes about a highly profitable US banking industry in 1994-2005. 
The report investigates the structure of the banking sector, and how it affects the 
profitability. He finds a positive relationship between profitability and market 
concentration in the U.S. banking industry. He claims that a higher concentration in 
the market affects the profitability positively in a structural way and not in an 
individual way. Profits extracted from increased market share or market concentration 
in the banking industry will not prevent the banks from going bankrupt in a financial 
crisis, which it could if profits come from efficiency.  
 
A highly concentrated market can have several different applications. First, the most 
recognized, a redistribution of profits within the banking industry at the expense of 
smaller banks. Second, a more powerful banking market can achieve high profits at 
the expense of non-banking firms, which can in fact be beneficial to smaller banks. If 
the large banks together are able to raise interest rate spreads, then the smaller banks 
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could increase their interest rate spreads as well. This shows that the largest banks can 
be price-leaders for the banking sector (Tregenna, 2009). Tregenna (2009) also argues 
that the economies of scale are not as beneficial in the banking sector in relation to the 
industrial sector, and the banks that can benefit from economies of scale is much 
smaller than the “large” banks in his sample, since the effect of economies of scale is 
diminishes with size. 
 
Uhde & Heimeshoff (2009) explain the implications of an increased market 
concentration on financial stability using two opposing theories, concentration 
fragility and concentration stability. The concentration stability view emphasizes that 
banks are able to reduce fragility in five ways. First, by having a high “capital buffer” 
to protect for macroeconomic and liquidity shocks. Second, higher franchise value 
comes with higher opportunity costs when facing bankruptcy, resulting in less risk-
taking behavior by management according the charter value hypothesis. Thirdly, 
having larger banks enables them to provide more credit monitoring services. 
Fourthly, having large banks facilitates monitoring and more efficient supervision. 
Lastly, these banks have large economies of scale and scope, which enables them to 
diversify their loan-portfolio risks more efficiently.  
 
The concentration fragility view, presents three main reasons why high market 
concentration reduces bank stability (Uhde & Heimeshoff, 2009). Large banks are 
able to receive guarantees or subsidies, making them ‘‘too big to fail”, consequently 
making moral hazard more severe. Secondly, if large banks give out high interest rate 
loans then the borrowers are more likely to take on risky investment to compensate 
for the expensive loan payments, resulting in borrowers being more likely to default 
on their loans. Lastly, having large market share and diversified assets may lead to 
less efficient management and increased operational risk. 
 
With most focus on profitable banking periods there seems to be a gap in research on 
the determinants of profitability during a financial crisis. Therefore, this thesis adds 
the aspect of a financial crisis to study how profitability can be explained by the 
market structure in their country’s banking sector. If the relationship looks different in 
a financial crisis than that needs to be kept in mind when studying the relationship in 
a profitable banking period as well. 
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2.3. Financial crisis 
A financial crisis can depend on a lot of things and is often very hard to anticipate. 
Mishkin, (1992) defines a financial crisis as: “A financial crisis is a disruption to 
financial markets in which adverse selection and moral hazard problems become 
much worse, so that financial markets are unable to efficiently channel funds to those 
who have the most productive investment opportunities.” Mishkin also mentions 
several factors that causes a financial crisis, which are: Increases in interest rates, 
stock market declines, increases in uncertainty, bank panics, and unanticipated 
declines in the aggregate price level. In the subprime crisis, which started in 2008, 
prices on houses fell rapidly due to a lot of loans given to people that could not pay. 
Banks were exposed to these loans and the liquidity in the banking market fell 
(Cornett et al., 2011). When the liquidity disappears from the market, all banks are at 
risk of having problem with short-term obligations because they rely on the short-
term borrowing from the market. When the U.S. banks started to have problems, these 
problems spread to Europe and the rest of the financial world. Because of the 
financial crisis a lot of banks profitability decreased and some of them even declared 
bankruptcy, with as much as 150 banks declaring bankruptcy in 2010 in the U.S. 
alone (Antoniades, A. 2015). Market specific information on how the financial crisis 
affects bank profitability and market structure are difficult to find for the regions in 
the study. 
 
2.4. Hypotheses  
To test the market structure and profitability relationship four hypotheses have been 
developed with different explanation of how market structure can affect profitability 
during a financial crisis. The first two hypotheses are the well-known market-power 
hypotheses that are tested by almost all research in a highly profitable banking period. 
The other two hypotheses have been created to give an explanation for the 
relationship in a financial crisis period with low profitability. 
 
Hypothesis 1 
Market share is positive and significant, and market concentration is non-significant. 
Being unable to reject this hypothesis would indicate that firms with large market 
shares and well-differentiated products are able to exercise market power and earn 
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supernormal profit, supporting the relative-market-power hypothesis (Shepherd, 
1982). This is perhaps the most common result, and accepted on the advanced 
economies in this thesis’ country sample, but before the financial crisis, by Mirzaei, 
Moore, & Liu (2013). 
 
Hypothesis 2 
Market concentration is positive and significant, and market share is non-significant. 
This implies that the structure-conduct-performance hypothesis cannot be rejected, 
meaning the banks are using their monopolistic power to set prices less favorable to 
consumers, with lower deposits rates and higher loan rates (Bourke, 1989). Tregenna 
(2009) provide support for the hypothesis when performed on the U.S. banking 
industry in the pre-crisis period.  
 
Hypothesis 3 
Market concentration is negative and significant, and market share is non-significant. 
The hypothesis indicates that the concentration of the country bank market has hurt 
the profitability of the individual banks in the market. The concentration fragility 
view presents a few potential explanations for how high concentration leads to lower 
stability. The large banks are “too big to fail”, borrowers default on their expensive 
loans, and increased operational risk and less efficient management (Uhde & 
Heimeshoff, 2009). These stability-reducing factors can lead to lower profitability 
during a financial crisis. 
 
Hypothesis 4 
Market share is negative and significant, and market concentration is positive and 
significant. This hypothesis would provide some support for the concentration 
stability view mentioned by Uhde & Heimeshoff (2009). Implying that the high 
“capital buffer” in the market is able to protect the banks from macroeconomic and 
liquidity shocks. The negative market share indicates that the largest banks’ 
profitability gets hit the hardest in a financial crisis.  
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3. Methodology 
3.1. Sample 
In order to capture the financial crisis, the period 2005 to 2014 was used. Years before 
and after the crisis were used to pick up the changes in profitability and other 
measurements during the period. Since this thesis’ time period caught part of the 
highly profitable banking sector before the crisis, three different regressions were 
tested to examine the differences between the periods. The time periods were the pre-
crisis period 2005 to 2007, crisis period 2008 to 2010, and post-crisis period 2011 to 
2014. The reason why this thesis defined the crisis period as the years 2008 to 2010 
was because the financial crisis started in 2008 and the two top years of bank 
bankruptcies were in 2009 and 2010 in the U.S. (Antoniades, 2015). To test for 
potential survivorship bias, a different result when only using active banks, the same 
time periods were also regressed with only active banks to enable a comparison 
between the two sample types.  
 
The advanced countries in the study consisted of the following Western European 
countries Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and United 
Kingdom. Mirzaei, Moore, & Liu justified using Western European countries because 
it was a highly competitive market. To represent emerging economies 10 countries in 
Eastern Europe and 13 countries in the Middle East were selected. In the Eastern 
Europe Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Their banking market had mainly been state-
owned, but had adapted to European Union banking regulation during the last decade 
(Mirzaei, Moore, & Liu, 2013). The following countries were used to portray the 
Middle East Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, and United Arab Emirates. The Middle Eastern banking 
market was a concentrated market, which had been very regulated and protected from 
foreign competition (Mirzaei, Moore, & Liu, 2013). 
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3.2. Data 
The data on profitability was collected over time and over the individual banks, and 
then regressed over the two dimensions. The data was mainly extracted from 
Bankscope because it was easy to access and had been used in most of earlier research 
regarding banks. Data on 1328 banks in 40 countries, 17 advanced countries and 23 
emerging countries, were collected. Which amounted to 934 banks in advanced 
countries and 394 banks in emerging countries. The same countries were used in the 
analysis as Mirzaei, Moore, & Liu (2013); however, unlike their studies the thesis 
included all commercial banks in the countries instead of only active banks, and used 
data from 2005 to 2014. The country level data used for macroeconomic variables 
was not accessible on Bankscope and therefore taken from the World Bank database. 
All values were in US dollars because it made the comparison between different 
countries possible. 
 
After finding the market structure ratios, the banks were filtered using consolidation 
codes in Bankscope to determine which banks were to be included in the sample. In 
Bankscope banks were divided into different consolidation codes depending on if it 
was a mother bank (C1 or C2) or a branch to the mother bank (U1). The information 
of the subsidiaries was already included in the mother banks’ financial statement. To 
avoid using the same information twice, the commercial banks with the consolidation 
code C1 and C2 were included, whereas banks denoted U1 were not included in the 
sample. Since the central banks do not have any commercial goals, they were not 
included in the sample. To assure none of the central banks were in the sample, since 
some central banks were code C1 or C2, all central banks were manually removed. 
 
To get a more reliable sample, the outliers in the sample were replaced using a 
winsorizing method. The method took values in the 1st percentile and replaced them 
with the lowest remaining value after the adjustment, and values in the 99th percentile 
were replaced with the highest remaining value (Gregory & Reeves, 2010). An 
exception was made in the case of interest rate spread in advanced economies, 
because it still had extreme values above after replacing the above 99th percentile 
values. To adjust this problem, the 90th percentile value was used to replace the 
highest 10 percentile values, which gave a much more reasonable value. As a result, 
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the average interest rate spread in advanced economies went from 47 percent to 
around 3.8 percent. This error must be attributed to inaccurate input of data in 
Bankscope. 
 
The banks in the sample were only domestic banks. This means that banks that had a 
mother bank in another country were excluded from the sample. In some cases, this 
led to misleading data, for example Morgan Stanley, an American bank with branches 
in the UK, was not included in the sample nor the market share calculations. Since the 
U.S. was not included in the study their assets were not be accounted for; however, a 
bank like Danske Bank, which was the fifth largest bank in the Swedish market was 
only included in Denmark. This led to an overestimated level of assets in the home 
country, resulted in a too high market share at home, and made the market share of 
the domestic banks in the country in which the bank was not included higher than in 
reality. 
 
The choice of variables to explain profitability could have been exposed to an 
endogeneity problem. It could be argued that bank assets were correlated to the error 
term if the bank’s assets picked up an effect of how well the bank had performance in 
the past. If this was the case, then past performance was an omitted variable 
correlated with the error term. 
 
3.3. Model 
An empirical model was developed, which used panel data to measure the 
performance of individual banks over time. Two independent models were used, one 
for emerging and another for advanced economies. The dependent variables were 
return on average assets (ROAA) and return on average equity (ROAE). The 
independent variables were market share, four-firm concentration, Herfindahl-
Hirschman index (HHI), logged bank assets, cost to income, overheads to assets, 
interest rate spread, equity to assets, inflation, and GDP growth. The variables are 
defined later in the section. The notation i indicated which bank, t represented time, 
and bank profitability was a performance measure for the individual bank. 
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 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑦!" = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑀𝑆!"  + 𝛽!𝐶𝑅4!" + 𝛽!𝐼𝑆!" + 𝛽!𝐸𝐴!" + 𝛽!𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒!" 
                                                  +𝛽!𝜋!" + 𝛽!𝛥𝐺𝐷𝑃!" + 𝛽!𝑂𝐴!" + 𝛽!𝐶𝐼!" + 𝜀!" 
 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑦!" = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑀𝑆!"  + 𝛽!𝐻𝐻𝐼!" + 𝛽!𝐼𝑆!" + 𝛽!𝐸𝐴!" + 𝛽!𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒!" 
                                                  +𝛽!𝜋!" + 𝛽!𝛥𝐺𝐷𝑃!" + 𝛽!𝑂𝐴!" + 𝛽!𝐶𝐼!" + 𝜀!" 
 
Abbreviation Variable 
MS Market	Share	
MC Market	Concentration	
IS Interest Rate Spread 
EA Equity to Assets 
Size Logged Bank Assets 
π Inflation 
ΔGDP GDP growth 
OA Overheads to Assets 
CI Cost to income 
 
 
The variables that were used in the thesis were chosen to mimic Mirzaei, Moore, & 
Liu’s (2013) as close as possible. Thereby, the results were comparable and 
conclusions could be drawn from differences between the two studies. Combining the 
same variables with the same countries over another time period gave the same test 
but applied to a financial crisis. To simplify the model, off-balance-sheet activities to 
total assets, bank age, foreign ownership, domestic credit, stock turnover ratio, and 
loan growth were not included. Cost to income was the only added variable, but 
Mirzaei, Moore, & Liu mentioned that they ran the regression with cost to income for 
robustness test and found an equivalent result. This thesis used four-firm 
concentration simply because four-firm concentration was closer to Bourke’s (1989) 
original three-firm concentration and at the same time comparable to Mirzaei, Moore, 
& Liu working paper (2011). 
 
The dependent variable in the model was profitability, with the ambition to 
demonstrate how it was affected by the independent variable in the model. To 
measure profitability, the model used return on equity and return on assets. Return on 
assets, or more commonly used return on average assets (ROAA), measured the net 
		 	 14	
income compared to the amount of assets of the firm. In contrast to return on average 
equity (ROAE) which used net income to equity. The two measurements showed how 
good the bank used its assets and equity to create revenues. The usage of average 
return on assets and average return on equity were because it took in differences in 
equity and differences in assets over time. Averages were used to reassure that none 
of the measurements had fluctuated a lot under the specific year.  
 
To measure market structure both market concentration and market share were used. 
This way, the model was able to distinguish between the relative-market-power 
hypothesis and the structure-conduct-performance hypothesis. Market share could be 
conducted by taking the individual firm's assets out of the total assets within the 
country's banking sector. To measure market concentration, the model used four-firm 
concentration, which was the fraction of bank assets held by the four largest banks in 
a country. As mentioned earlier, four-firm concentration was used because Mirzaei, 
Moore, & Liu had it in their working paper (2011), and was closer to Bourke’s (1989) 
original three-firm. For the robust purposes the model also used the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index, which was the sum of the squared market shares of all the banks in 
the country market. 
 
To pick up the country effect two macroeconomic factors were included, real GDP 
growth and inflation. This took into account the findings of Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven, 
& Levine (2004) and Athanasoglou, Brissimis and Delis (2008), which were 
mentioned earlier. Where the first, found wider margin and greater returns as a result 
of high inflation, and the later a positive GDP growth profitability relationship. 
 
The model also included controls for other bank specific variables. The effect of 
efficiency was controlled for indirectly using three variables. First, bank size was 
used to capture the economics of scale. To proxy bank size the model used a bank’s 
logged total assets, which was equivalent to Mirzaei, Moore, & Liu (2013). Cost to 
income showed the profitability of the operating activities, operating costs divided by 
the operating income. An increase in this ratio showed that the costs increase more 
than the incomes over the same period. This variable was included as an expense 
management measure to control for efficiency. Overheads to total assets captured 
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differences in cost structure when comparing banks because it displayed cost to 
income divided with total assets (Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven, & Levine, 2004). 
 
Interest rate spread added the profitability on loans; it showed the difference between 
the interest that the bank paid on borrowing from its customers and the interest the 
bank received to lend out money. This spreads gave an approximation of how much 
power the bank had in its price setting (Golin, 2001). 
 
Equity to total assets was included to capture the capital risk of leverage. When 
leverage was high, low equity, the bank could enjoy good profits when doing well, 
but had a higher risk of bankruptcy when performing badly. When this ratio was high, 
the leverage was low, and the cost of funding was low, as well as the risk (Golin, 
2001). 
 
Separate regressions were used, with bank fixed effects and clustered standard errors 
at the bank level, for robustness of the original model. The Hausman test determined 
that the model should control for fixed effect rather than random effects. Fixed effect 
controlled for the characteristic of the individual bank which may or may not affect 
their profitability. The country effect of the bank was accounted for indirectly by 
inflation and GDP growth. 
4. Results and Analysis 
4.1. Results 
In this part of the thesis the result of the regressions are presented with market 
structure as a function of profitability for the four different time periods in advanced 
and emerging economies. In addition, the effect of a survivorship bias and using fixed 
effect are displayed. 
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4.1.1. Advanced and emerging economies 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of dataset in emerging and advanced economies. 
Descriptive statistics Advanced economies Emerging economies 
n Mean St. Dev. Min Max n Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
ROAA 6807 0.78 2.18 -9.97 16.25 2938 1.39 3.31 -15.98 18.44 
ROAE 6803 6.05 13.79 -94.28 49.24 2937 8.98 16.16 -83.97 47.63 
Four Firm 9239 0.59 0.16 0.38 0.95 3882 0.69 0.15 0.44 1 
HHI 9027 0.13 0.06 0.06 0.30 3844 0.17 0.1 0.08 0.7 
Market share 6817 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.33 2943 0.07 0.09 0 0.49 
Overheads to total assets 6798 0.04 0.08 0.00 0.66 2934 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.28 
Interest rate spread 5416 0.04 0.03 -0.03 0.21 2273 0.04 0.03 -0.15 0.1 
Inflation 9176 0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.04 3786 0.05 0.06 -0.15 0.2 
Log bank assets 6818 16.17 2.20 10.52 21.39 2945 15.01 1.67 10.94 18.35 
GDP growth 9152 0.01 0.02 -0.06 0.06 3819 0.04 0.04 -0.08 0.13 
Equity to total assets 6817 12.59 15.48 0.61 94.56 2944 18.6 17.8 2.86 96.88 
Four-firm concentration and HHI are measures of market concentration  
More detailed data is available in Table 17 and Table 18 in the appendix 
 
Table 2. Correlation matrix  
Correlation Matrix ROAA ROAE Four Firm HHI 
Market 
share 
Overheads/ 
assets 
Interest 
spread Inflation 
Log bank 
assets 
GDP 
growth 
Equity/ 
assets 
ROAE 0,6331*** 
          
Four Firm -0,0138 0,0422*** 
         
HHI -0,0028 0,0426*** 0,94*** 
        
Market share -0,0162 0,0967*** 0,3527*** 0,3246*** 
       
Overheads/assets 0,1951*** 0,0262 -0,075*** -0,06*** -0,149*** 
      
Interest spread 0,0442*** 0,0287*** -0,018* -0,028*** -0,067*** 0,0522*** 
     
Inflation 0,1513*** 0,1347*** 0,0421*** 0,0324*** 0,0813*** -0,0053 -0,0172 
    
Log bank assets -0,136*** 0,0127 -0,053*** -0,061*** 0,3773*** -0,3466*** -0,0347*** -0,157*** 
   
GDP growth 0,191*** 0,2154*** 0,1246*** 0,1183*** 0,1177*** -0,0182* 0,02* 0,4217*** -0,119*** 
  
Equity/assets 0,3385*** 0,0052 -0,031*** -0,027*** -0,156*** 0,3612*** 0,1257*** 0,1556*** -0,4486*** 0,1031*** 
 Cost to income -0,378*** -0,435*** -0,095*** -0,08*** -0,173*** 0,2635*** -0,0478*** -0,158*** -0,1616*** -0,138*** -0,0047 
Four-firm concentration and HHI are measures of market concentration  
* significant at 10% ** significant at 5% *** significant at 1% 
 
The descriptive statistics above showed differences between the variables in the two 
economies for the entire sample period 2005-2014. It displayed that emerging 
economies had higher mean returns using both profitability measures. The mean 
market concentration and market share were also higher in emerging economies than 
advanced economies. 
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Yearly averages of the profitability of the banks in the sample were presented in 
figure 1 below in form of ROAA and ROAE. The figure displayed high profitability 
before the financial crisis, a steep decline under the crisis, and low values after the 
financial crisis. The figure showed that emerging economies had higher returns than 
advanced economies in pre-crisis period; however, this was not the case during the 
crisis period in which emerging economies had lower returns. The emerging 
economies were much more volatile when looking at both ROAE and ROAA. 
 
Figure 1. 
   (a)    (b) 
 
light blue = Emerging economies, dark blue = Advanced economies 
 
Entire sample period 2005-2014 
In advanced economies four-firm concentration and Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
were both positive, but only four-firm concentration regressed on ROAE was 
significant. Market share was negative and significant with ROAA but not with 
ROAE for the period 2005-2014. The expense management measure, cost to income 
was negative significant related to returns. The capital structure ratio was close to 
zero but slightly positive using ROAA, and somewhat negative using ROAE but 
always significant. Overheads to total assets was positively and significant correlated 
to profits. Interest rate spread had a negative and significant relationship to 
profitability in advanced economies (Table 7, appendix). 
 
In emerging economies both market structure variables, four-firm concentration and 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index, were positive and significant. Market share was only 
negative and significant when run with ROAA regressed on four-firm concentration. 
Interest rate spread was negative but non-significant for emerging economies. Cost to 
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income, overheads to total assets, and capital structure all showed same signs and 
significance as in advanced economies (Table 7, appendix). 
 
 
Table 3. Determinants of bank profitability 2005-2014. 
2005-2014 
Advanced Economies Emerging Economies 
ROAA ROAE ROAA ROAE 
Four-firm concentration 0.273**  3.755*** 		 1.111***  8.806***   
HHI 		 0.147 
 
4.298 		 1.914*** 
 
10.779*** 
Market share -1.269** -1.097** 2.436 3.766 -0.854** -0.685* -1.587 1.802 
Four-firm concentration and HHI are measures of market concentration  
The control variables are available in the complete regression in Table 7 in the appendix 
* significant at 10% ** significant at 5% *** significant at 1% 
 
 Pre-crisis period 2005-2007 
When simply looking at the pre-crises period 2005-2007 in advanced economies 
market share was positive and significant with ROAE but not with ROAA. Market 
concentration, using four-firm concentration and Herfindahl-Hirschman index, was 
found to be positive and significant when correlated to profitability, in all but 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index regressed on ROAA. Interest rate spread showed a 
negative significant relation to return in the high profitable period 2005-2007. Cost to 
income, overheads to total assets, and equity to total assets showed the same sign and 
significance to the results of the entire sample period (Table 8, appendix). 
The pre-crisis period in emerging economies showed a positive market concentration 
coefficient with exception of ROAE regressed on four-firm concentration. The results 
found market share to be negative significant with ROAA but not with ROAE. Cost to 
income, overheads to total assets, and capital structure were all equivalent to the 
results of the entire sample period. Interest rate spread was positive non-significant 
with ROAA and negative non-significant with ROAE.  
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Table 4. Determinants of bank profitability during the pre-crisis 2005-2007. 
2005-2007 
Advanced Economies Emerging Economies 
ROAA ROAE ROAA ROAE 
Four-firm concentration 0.400** 		 6.412*** 		 1.342**   3.055   
HHI 		 0.659 
 
13.009*** 		 1.780*** 
 
10.519** 
Market share 0.602 0.721 11.451*** 14.076*** -2.102*** -1.986*** 3.184 0.145 
Four-firm concentration and HHI are measures of market concentration  
The control variables are available in the complete regression in Table 8 in the appendix 
* significant at 10% ** significant at 5% *** significant at 1% 
 
Crisis period 2008-2010 
The crisis period 2008-2010 in advanced economies showed a noticeable difference to 
the entire sample period. In the period the market concentration coefficients were 
negative with both ROAA and ROAE and significant with ROAA. In contrast to the 
previously measured time period, this period showed no relationship between market 
share and profitability. Some of the other control variables such as cost to income, 
overheads to total assets, and equity to total assets had the same sign and significance 
as the 2005-2014 period. Interest rate spread was significant and negative correlated 
with profitability in the crisis period.  
 
Examining the crisis-period in emerging economies displayed the same positive and 
significant market concentration coefficients as when running the entire sample 
period. Market share was only negative significant when running ROAE regressed on 
four-firm concentration. Some of the other control variables such as cost to income, 
overheads to total assets, and equity to total assets had the same sign and significance 
as the 2005-2014 period. Interest rate spread was negative non-significant in the crisis 
period 2008-2010. 
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Table 5. Determinants of bank profitability during the financial crisis 2008-2010. 
2008-2010 
Advanced Economies Emerging Economies 
ROAA ROAE ROAA ROAE 
Four-firm concentration -0.878*** 		 -3.368 		 1.195**   15.862***   
HHI 		 -2.347*** 
 
-6.726 		 2.474*** 
 
22.030*** 
Market share -0.147 0.170 0.509 2.730 -1.165 -1.194 -17.912* -13.571* 
Four-firm concentration and HHI are measures of market concentration  
The control variables are available in the complete regression in Table 9 in the appendix 
* significant at 10% ** significant at 5% *** significant at 1% 
 
Post-crisis period 2011-2014 
In advanced economies the post-crisis period showed no signs of a market structure 
and profitability relationship. Market share and the market concentration coefficients 
could not significantly explain bank profitability during the 2011-2014 period. Cost to 
income and overheads to total assets were equivalent to the results of the entire 
sample period. For this time period equity to total assets was positive and significant 
using both ROAA and ROAE. The post-crisis period had the same negative 
significant interest rate spread as the all time period in advanced economies. 
 
Emerging economies had the same absence of relationship between profitability and 
market structure in the post-crises period as advanced economies. In contrast to the 
results of the whole crisis period, overheads to total assets were positive but not 
significant for the 2011-2014 period. In line with the results of advanced economies 
in the post-crisis period, equity to total assets was positive and significant using both 
ROAA and ROAE. Equivalent to the results of the 2005-2014 period cost to income 
was negative significant. For the first time interest rate spread was significant but also 
negative using both ROAA and ROAE. 
 
Table 6. Determinants of bank profitability during the post-crisis 2010-2014. 
2011-2014 
Advanced Economies Emerging Economies 
ROAA ROAE ROAA ROAE 
Four-firm concentration -0.210 		 0.548 		 0.311   0.664   
HHI 		 -0.868 
 
-2.387 		 0.963 
 
-1.741 
Market share -0.696 -1.639 -6.977 -5.829 -0.913 -1.137* 1.150 2.075 
Four-firm concentration and HHI are measures of market concentration  
The control variables are available in the complete regression in Table 10 in the appendix 
* significant at 10% ** significant at 5% *** significant at 1% 
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4.1.2. Survivorship bias 
Comparing the regressions with only active banks to the other that contained all 
banks, the coefficient for market concentration was less positive in the regression with 
only active banks in emerging economies in all of the four different time periods with 
an exception of ROAE 2008-2010 (Table 16, appendix). Market concentration was 
more positive in advanced economies when using only active banks for all time 
periods but the 2011-2014 period. The market share coefficient was more positive in 
the regression with only active banks than with all banks in both economies to large 
degree. This did not hold for the 2008-2010 period, but also not for emerging 
economies 2005-2007 using ROAE and Herfindahl-Hirschman index, and advanced 
economies 2011-2014 using ROAA and four-firm concentration. 
 
4.1.3. Fixed effects 
The regression with fixed effect can be found in Table 15 in the appendix. Market 
concentration was positive significance for both economies for the 2005-2014. Market 
share was positive significant for emerging economies and non-significant for 
advanced economies. In advanced economies, the interest rate spread was positive 
significant for the entire period, but negative and significant in the crisis period. 
Interest rate spread was non-significant in emerging economies. 
4.2. Analysis 
 
In this section the results of the paper are analyzed with each time period seperatly. 
More precisely, the market structure-profit relationship, surviorship bias, fixed effect, 
profitability robustness, omitted variable bias, and the sample data are evaluated.  
 
4.2.1. Advanced and emerging economies 
 
Entire sample period 2005-2014 
In both advanced and emerging economies support was found of a positive market 
concentration and negative market share but with different significance level and 
robustness when tests were applied to the entire period 2005-2014. This results 
implied that the largest banks’ profitability gets hit the hardest and banks in a 
concentrated market performed better during this period. This outcome also showed 
support of the concentration stability view because the high concentration in the 
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banking sector enabled protection against macroeconomic and liquidity shocks, at 
least in terms of profitability. The results for the 2005-2014 period showed that a 
negative market share was more robust in advanced economies, and positive market 
concentration had stronger support in emerging economies, in terms of significance 
with both ROAA and ROAE. Strangely, the negative market share relationship was 
not significant for any of the three separate time periods in neither economy.  
 
Consequently, the findings did not find support of neither the relative-market-power 
(RMP) hypothesis nor the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) hypothesis, and as a 
result, first hypothesis and second hypothesis could be rejected. This meant that banks 
were not able to use their monopolistic power, nor their large market shares regressed 
on well-differentiated products to achieve higher profits during a crisis. Instead, the 
results showed that a more concentrated banking sector in a country enabled the banks 
to achieve the highest returns in a crisis. This could be attributed to largest banks 
being price-leaders for the banking sector, align with Tregenna (2009). The findings 
seemed to show the reverse relationship between high concentration and 
redistribution of profits compared to Tregenna (2009), since a negative market share 
coefficient regressed on a positive market concentration indicated that small firms 
were able to make the higher profits at the expense of large firm during the crisis.  
 
Pre-crisis period 2005-2007 
The results of the pre-crisis period 2005-2007 confirmed Mirzaei, Moore, & Liu’s 
(2013) positive relationship between bank performance and market share in advanced 
economies, at least in terms of ROAE. In addition, this thesis found advanced 
economies to have a positive market concentration and profitability relationship. This 
indicated that the relative-market-power hypothesis, first hypothesis, did not hold. 
Instead both market structure coefficients were positive, this could be explained by an 
increase in profits at the expense of other industries. Being a large bank was 
beneficial because they are able to be price-leaders and raise interest rate spreads the 
most. The interest rate spread increase by large banks enabled small banks to increase 
theirs too (Tregenna, 2009). The negative interest rate spread-return relationship in 
the period 2005-2007 was contradictory to Mirzaei, Moore, & Liu (2013) findings. 
This seemed to be a limitation of the model, but a positive interest rate spread was 
found when controlled for fixed effects.  
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In emerging economies, the results of Mirzaei, Moore, & Liu (2013) in the period 
2005-2007 were not confirmed, where this thesis found a significant negative market 
share instead of a close to zero non-significant result. This could be partly attributed 
to Mirzaei, Moore, & Liu only using active banks because of the positive market 
share bias. In addition, it could be a more positive coefficient for the years 1999-2004, 
which weighed up the level of their market share coefficient for the entire period. The 
positive significant market concentration coefficient was non-existent when looking at 
the period with active banks; however, using all banks the fourth hypothesis could be 
rejected. 
 
Crisis period 2008-2010 
The crisis-period 2008-2010 showed distinct differences in the market structure and 
bank performance relationship between the two economies. In advanced economies 
the third hypothesis could not be rejected. Result suggested that the performance of 
the banking sector was reduced by the high concentration in the market. According to 
Uhde & Heimeshoff (2009) the large banks were “too big to fail”, which had caused 
them to increase risk because of the belief that the bank would bailed out by the 
government. The higher interest rate spreads, due to lower competition in the market, 
could have led to borrowers defaulting on their loans, as result of the attempt to 
compensate for the expensive loan payments. 
 
In emerging economies, the results showed that a country with high concentration in 
the banking sector were able to generate the highest profits in a financial crisis. There 
was also some support of the largest banks’ profitability taking the biggest hit. As a 
result, the fourth hypothesis cannot be rejected. This suggested that the market was 
able to protect for the banks from macroeconomic and liquidity shocks, in support of 
the concentration stability view (Uhde & Heimeshoff, 2009). 
 
Post-crisis period 2011-2014 
The non-significant relationship between market structure and bank profitability in 
the post crisis suggested that all hypotheses could be rejected. Market structure in 
terms of market share and market concentration did not seem to be a determinant of 
bank profitability after the financial crisis. The true determinant factors have not been 
further tested in this thesis. 
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4.2.2. Survivorship bias  
In advanced economies market concentration was negative and significant 2008-2010 
when using all banks but not when only using active banks. This implied that if the 
thesis only used active banks it would be able to reject the third hypothesis. Including 
all banks also gave a significant negative market share for the 2005-2014 period as 
opposed to using only active banks. The pre-crisis period in emerging economies had 
a positive significant market concentration with all banks but not with active banks. 
The 2005-2014 period had a negative and significant market share with all banks, in 
contrast to the non-significant market share with active banks. The previous two 
situations of using active banks could have resulted in incorrectly rejecting the fourth 
hypothesis.   
 
4.2.3. Profitability robustness and omitted variable bias 
This thesis achieved results with higher significance level when using return on 
average assets (ROAA) than return on average equity (ROAE), this could potentially 
be explained by the calculation of market share and market concentration using total 
assets, which could have biased the results. The regressions in this thesis had less 
robustness between the market structure variables in comparison to Mirzaei, Moore, 
& Liu (2013). This could partly be explained by the correlation differences between 
return on average assets (ROAA) and return on average equity (ROAE), where this 
thesis had 0.633 (Table 3) and Mirzaei, Moore, & Liu (2013) had 0.816. Since the 
two variables were not as similar in this sample, they will not give as robust results. 
As a result of this model not using all variables in Mirzaei, Moore, & Liu study this 
thesis could also be exposed to omitted variable bias.  
 
4.2.4. Fixed effects 
The market concentration was equivalent in terms of the sign and significance for the 
2005-2014 to the regressions without fixed effect (Table 15). The result of market 
share showed lack of robustness with a negative significant coefficient without fixed 
effects and positive when including fixed effects in emerging economies and non-
significant in advanced economies. The fixed effect regression gave a more realistic 
positive interest rate spread in advanced economies during the entire, and a slightly 
negative significant coefficient in the crisis period.  
 
		 	 25	
4.2.5. Data 
Four-firm concentration (figure 2a), Herfindahl-Hirschman index (figure 3, 
appendix), and market share (figure 2b) showed the same pattern. The banks in 
emerging economies were on average fewer and larger, in terms of market share, than 
in advanced economies. The four-firm concentration had been declining in both 
emerging and advanced economies since the start of the measured data in this thesis. 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index had very similar movement to which four-firm 
concentration had over time. The market share in emerging economies was on 
average much larger than in advanced economies; this came from a much higher 
competition in the advanced banking market. 
 
 
Figure 2. 
   (a)    (b) 
 
light blue = Emerging economies, dark blue = Advanced economies 
 
The two macroeconomic measurement variables used in the thesis were Inflation and 
GDP growth, and the averages are displayed in figure 4 and 5 in the appendix. GDP 
growth fluctuated about the same amount in both emerging and advanced economies, 
and under the crisis a large decline in growth appeared. The inflation in advanced 
economies had almost no volatility, and in emerging economies the volatility was 
very high. The extreme inflation average in 2009 in emerging economies came from 
high deflation in some Arabic countries. 
 
The interest rate spread can be seen in figure 6 in appendix and showed that the 
spreads were much larger in emerging economies than in advanced economies. The 
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required return was higher in riskier bank countries and therefore the spreads should 
be larger. On the contrary, equity to total assets (figure 7, appendix) showed that the 
leverage of the bank in the advanced economies on average was higher, which 
implied that they had more risk. 
5. Conclusions and Future Research 
5.1. Conclusions 
This thesis examines the extent profitability in both emerging and advanced 
economies can be explained by market structure, more specifically market share and 
market concentration, during the period 2005-2014. The period is separated into three 
parts to capture the financial crisis as well as the periods before and after. The sample 
includes 1328 banks in 40 countries, 17 advanced countries and 23 emerging 
countries. The results support neither of the most well-known market power 
hypotheses, the relative-market-power hypothesis nor the structure-conduct-
performance hypothesis, in the crisis period 2008-2010. In advanced economies the 
paper finds market concentration to negatively affect profitability during the crisis 
period, suggesting that stability and profitability are reduced with high market 
concentration in the banking sector. On the contrary, in emerging economies market 
concentration positively affect profitability and market share of the bank negatively 
influence profits. This result implies the largest banks’ profitability gets hit the 
hardest and banks in a concentrated market perform better. Some consistencies are 
found between the two economies in the sample period 2005-2014, with the same 
negative market share and positive market concentration as emerging economies in 
the financial crisis. The post-crisis period 2011-2014 did not find any significance of 
the market structure and profitability relationship, which indicates that something else 
is the main determinant of bank profitability after the financial crisis. The study finds 
evidence of a survivorship bias in this sample period, and it is therefore important to 
include the non-active banks when performing market structure-profit research.  
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5.2. Future Research 
This thesis only investigated the profitability aspect of banks and the concentration of 
the market. It could also be of interest to assess how financial aid from the 
government affects the concentration in the market and the profitability during a 
financial crisis. Further tests on the robustness of the model by performing the same 
analyzes on different markets, and different time period or even earlier crises. Future 
research could follow up on the non-existing relationship between market structure 
and profitability after the crisis, and study what the actual determinants of profitability 
were in that period. Also, how regulation changes after the financial crisis may have 
affected the market structure and profitability relationship.  
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      Table 7.  Determinants of bank profitability 2005-2014. 
  ROAA ROAE 
  Advanced Economies Emerging Economies Advanced Economies Emerging Economies 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Four firm concentration 0.273** 
 
1.111***   3.755*** 
 
8.806***   
  (2.05) 
 
(4.21)   (3.06) 
 
(4.55)   
Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index  
0.147 
 
1.914*** 
 
4.298 
 
10.779*** 
  
 
(0.43) 
 
(4.52) 
 
(1.35) 
 
(3.56) 
Market share -1.269** -1.097** -0.854** -0.685* 2.436 3.766 -1.587 1.802 
  (2.29) (2.04) (2.02) (1.84) (0.66) (1.02) (0.43) (0.52) 
Overheads to total assets 7.785*** 7.748*** 28.530*** 28.501*** 55.784*** 54.713*** 157.286*** 157.147*** 
  (6.94) (6.80) (6.19) (6.20) (10.32) (10.09) (5.66) (5.63) 
Interest rate spread -3.656*** -3.649*** -0.556 -0.567 -31.202*** -32.681*** -3.620* -3.752* 
  (5.75) (5.62) (0.74) (0.76) (5.78) (5.94) (1.79) (1.85) 
Inflation 6.373*** 7.011*** 1.263* 1.102 78.668*** 85.060*** 8.118** 6.436* 
  (3.57) (3.88) (1.75) (1.54) (4.89) (5.10) (2.12) (1.69) 
Log bank assets -0.003 -0.005 0.095** 0.093** -0.397*** -0.412*** 1.023*** 0.892*** 
  (0.26) (0.39) (2.46) (2.43) (3.93) (3.99) (3.58) (3.11) 
GDP growth 7.663*** 7.714*** 8.527*** 8.642*** 86.959*** 87.761*** 69.062*** 70.113*** 
  (10.51) (10.48) (8.93) (9.01) (11.60) (11.57) (10.09) (10.17) 
Equity to total assets 0.059*** 0.060*** 0.062*** 0.062*** -0.088*** -0.083** -0.091*** -0.095*** 
  (7.08) (7.06) (8.22) (8.39) (2.64) (2.49) (2.76) (2.88) 
Cost to income -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.047*** -0.047*** -0.291*** -0.290*** -0.326*** -0.326*** 
  (19.69) (19.44) (10.05) (10.03) (23.22) (22.92) (8.98) (8.92) 
Constant 1.586*** 1.754*** -0.109 0.355 28.390*** 30.152*** 1.178 7.182 
  (5.15) (5.75) (0.12) (0.44) (12.45) (13.75) (0.18) (1.18) 
Observations 4961 4829 2208 2203 4935 4803 2191 2186 
R-squared 0.36 0.36 0.43 0.43 0.28 0.27 0.32 0.32 
Robust t statistics in parentheses 
       * significant at 10% 
       ** significant at 5% 
       *** significant at 1% 
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  Table 8. Determinants of bank profitability during the pre-crisis 2005-2007. 
  ROAA ROAE 
  Advanced Economies Emerging Economies Advanced Economies Emerging Economies 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Four firm concentration 0.400** 
 
1.342**   6.412*** 
 
3.055   
  (2.32) 
 
(2.49)   (4.24) 
 
(1.09)   
Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
 
0.659 
 
1.780*** 
 
13.009*** 
 
10.519** 
  
 
(1.55) 
 
(2.82) 
 
(3.74) 
 
(2.20) 
Market share 0.602 0.721 -2.102*** -1.986*** 11.451*** 14.076*** 3.184 0.145 
  (1.44) (1.50) (2.80) (2.76) (2.91) (3.56) (0.90) (0.04) 
Overheads to total assets 25.390*** 25.680*** 75.823*** 76.456*** 135.624*** 131.503*** 332.926*** 332.085*** 
  (3.46) (3.30) (5.85) (5.91) (4.10) (3.84) (8.10) (8.17) 
Interest rate spread -4.580*** -4.728*** 0.510 0.495 -39.175*** -41.125*** -0.446 -0.744 
  (4.44) (4.49) (0.67) (0.67) (6.14) (6.27) (0.21) (0.39) 
Inflation -4.077 -5.217 1.072 0.916 -50.555 -79.930** 15.228** 15.943** 
  (1.18) (1.35) (0.64) (0.56) (1.59) (2.28) (2.43) (2.57) 
Log bank assets -0.010 -0.010 0.195** 0.189** 0.027 -0.053 0.369 0.549 
  (0.42) (0.36) (2.43) (2.38) (0.20) (0.36) (1.07) (1.63) 
GDP growth 0.875 1.811 3.813 4.698* 23.644 25.624 26.810** 29.068** 
  (0.32) (0.60) (1.38) (1.67) (1.11) (1.20) (2.41) (2.52) 
Equity to total assets 0.073*** 0.075*** 0.104*** 0.103*** -0.356*** -0.346*** -0.337*** -0.332*** 
  (3.38) (3.34) (5.32) (5.33) (3.67) (3.55) (6.01) (6.30) 
Cost to income -0.041*** -0.042*** -0.091*** -0.090*** -0.324*** -0.329*** -0.474*** -0.473*** 
  (7.56) (7.40) (8.20) (8.21) (13.55) (13.16) (12.29) (12.30) 
Constant 2.515*** 2.723*** -0.363 0.264 29.409*** 33.869*** 27.089*** 24.584*** 
  (3.84) (3.79) (0.23) (0.18) (8.91) (9.70) (3.72) (3.63) 
Observations 1233 1163 545 545 1225 1154 540 540 
R-squared 0.59 0.59 0.66 0.66 0.34 0.34 0.50 0.50 
Robust t statistics in parentheses 
       * significant at 10% 
       ** significant at 5% 
       *** significant at 1% 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
		 	 34	
          Table 9. Determinants of bank profitability during the financial crisis 2008-2010. 
  ROAA ROAE 
  Advanced Economies Emerging Economies Advanced Economies Emerging Economies 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Four firm concentration -0.878*** 
 
1.195**   -3.368 
 
15.862***   
  (2.67) 
 
(2.43)   (1.08) 
 
(3.84)   
Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
 
-2.347*** 
 
2.474*** 
 
-6.726 
 
22.030*** 
  
 
(2.80) 
 
(3.62) 
 
(0.88) 
 
(3.74) 
Market share -0.147 0.170 -1.165 -1.194 0.509 2.730 -17.912** -13.571* 
  (0.27) (0.31) (1.45) (1.64) (0.07) (0.36) (2.35) (1.92) 
Overheads to total assets 6.213*** 5.580*** 34.161*** 34.024*** 37.598*** 38.593*** 223.159*** 223.021*** 
  (3.02) (2.68) (5.14) (5.20) (4.87) (5.19) (5.67) (5.73) 
Interest rate spread -5.389*** -4.611*** -1.204 -1.256* -33.139*** -30.449*** -6.915 -7.208* 
  (4.19) (3.40) (1.51) (1.66) (3.31) (3.10) (1.55) (1.72) 
Inflation 9.788* 7.210 0.336 0.205 84.354 49.746 1.331 0.001 
  (1.85) (1.45) (0.35) (0.21) (1.44) (0.95) (0.29) (0.00) 
Log bank assets -0.014 -0.012 0.179*** 0.188*** -0.529** -0.628*** 2.490*** 2.354*** 
  (0.65) (0.54) (3.02) (3.21) (2.24) (2.86) (5.06) (4.88) 
GDP growth 5.448*** 4.700*** 8.689*** 8.695*** 36.519*** 29.026*** 81.754*** 81.108*** 
  (4.50) (3.97) (6.15) (6.22) (3.71) (2.85) (6.15) (6.13) 
Equity to total assets 0.036** 0.052** 0.039*** 0.039*** -0.016 -0.032 -0.035 -0.039 
  (2.10) (2.54) (3.18) (3.28) (0.19) (0.43) (0.66) (0.74) 
Cost to income -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.042*** -0.042*** -0.286*** -0.282*** -0.302*** -0.302*** 
  (9.49) (9.25) (11.20) (11.17) (11.17) (11.53) (7.56) (7.56) 
Constant 2.732*** 2.340*** -1.571 -1.292 34.185*** 34.637*** -29.232*** -20.171** 
  (4.36) (3.60) (1.33) (1.25) (6.50) (7.41) (2.89) (2.24) 
Observations 1358 1435 646 646 1348 1424 640 640 
R-squared 0.26 0.27 0.42 0.42 0.21 0.20 0.40 0.40 
Robust t statistics in parentheses 
       * significant at 10% 
       ** significant at 5% 
       *** significant at 1% 
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          Table 10. Determinants of bank profitability during the post-crisis 2010-2014. 
  ROAA ROAE 
  Advanced Economies Emerging Economies Advanced Economies Emerging Economies 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Four firm concentration -0.210 
 
0.311   0.548 
 
0.664   
  (0.88) 
 
(0.98)   (0.23) 
 
(0.22)   
Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
 
-0.868 
 
0.963 
 
-2.387 
 
-1.741 
  
 
(1.45) 
 
(1.49) 
 
(0.40) 
 
(0.28) 
Market share -0.696 -1.639 -0.913 -1.137* -6.977 -5.829 1.150 2.075 
  (1.28) (1.40) (1.51) (1.89) (0.95) (0.80) (0.20) (0.35) 
Overheads to total assets 5.963*** 5.622*** 10.385* 10.432* 36.621*** 34.119*** 38.406 36.727 
  (5.55) (5.34) (1.90) (1.88) (4.66) (4.47) (0.92) (0.86) 
Interest rate spread -2.568** -3.138*** -2.090*** -2.078*** -20.148** -22.551** -11.314*** -11.380*** 
  (2.22) (2.64) (3.21) (3.19) (2.10) (2.30) (3.31) (3.32) 
Inflation -1.786 -1.564 -1.936* -2.027* 42.274 45.858 -12.503 -14.414 
  (0.48) (0.41) (1.66) (1.72) (1.05) (1.11) (1.46) (1.64) 
Log bank assets -0.036** -0.024 0.135*** 0.150*** -0.451** -0.428** 0.980** 0.931* 
  (2.04) (1.10) (2.75) (2.91) (2.43) (2.19) (2.14) (1.93) 
GDP growth 8.135*** 8.099*** 4.416* 4.228* 100.766*** 100.739*** 29.159 32.512 
  (4.70) (4.61) (1.79) (1.65) (4.69) (4.62) (1.26) (1.37) 
Equity to total assets 0.031** 0.033** 0.058*** 0.059*** 0.054 0.068 0.116** 0.112** 
  (2.37) (2.48) (8.26) (8.34) (0.79) (0.99) (2.09) (2.03) 
Cost to income -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.259*** -0.256*** -0.264*** -0.257*** 
  (11.38) (10.99) (6.26) (6.13) (14.68) (14.06) (4.92) (4.77) 
Constant 2.301*** 2.120*** -0.420 -0.591 26.672*** 26.639*** 3.432 4.458 
  (4.42) (3.92) (0.41) (0.58) (6.56) (7.01) (0.35) (0.45) 
Observations 2155 2062 994 985 2146 2052 988 979 
R-squared 0.27 0.27 0.38 0.37 0.21 0.21 0.23 0.22 
Robust t statistics in parentheses 
       * significant at 10% 
       ** significant at 5% 
       *** significant at 1% 
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          Table 11. Determinants of bank profitability using only active banks 2005-2014. 
  ROAA ROAE 
  Advanced Economies Emerging Economies Advanced Economies Emerging Economies 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Four firm concentration 0.297** 
 
0.778***   4.782*** 
 
6.464***   
  (2.52) 
 
(2.60)   (3.72) 
 
(2.97)   
Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
 
0.429 
 
1.340*** 
 
7.613** 
 
7.839** 
  
 
(1.24) 
 
(2.88) 
 
(2.22) 
 
(2.48) 
Market share -0.122 0.070 -0.650* -0.580 3.690 5.878 -0.321 1.718 
  (0.41) (0.23) (1.72) (1.63) (0.88) (1.41) (0.09) (0.50) 
Overheads to total assets 8.744*** 8.835*** 43.577*** 43.506*** 76.465*** 75.110*** 286.835*** 286.619*** 
  (5.16) (5.03) (7.14) (7.11) (7.28) (7.03) (7.51) (7.46) 
Interest rate spread -4.894*** -4.964*** -0.431 -0.443 -30.543*** -31.860*** -0.949 -1.048 
  (5.90) (5.91) (0.43) (0.45) (4.59) (4.77) (0.29) (0.32) 
Inflation 5.002** 4.824** 0.760 0.659 75.849*** 73.459*** 4.493 3.580 
  (2.56) (2.45) (0.98) (0.85) (4.11) (3.89) (1.07) (0.85) 
Log bank assets -0.015 -0.017 0.072** 0.073** -0.438*** -0.441*** 0.732*** 0.650** 
  (1.45) (1.53) (2.11) (2.04) (3.53) (3.49) (2.89) (2.42) 
GDP growth 6.379*** 6.499*** 10.190*** 10.335*** 87.798*** 90.169*** 86.044*** 87.223*** 
  (9.38) (9.45) (9.46) (9.55) (10.38) (10.58) (10.47) (10.51) 
Equity to total assets 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.045*** 0.046*** -0.194*** -0.186*** -0.244*** -0.246*** 
  (7.60) (7.62) (4.70) (4.76) (4.15) (4.10) (6.64) (6.69) 
Cost to income -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.064*** -0.064*** -0.287*** -0.285*** -0.445*** -0.441*** 
  (15.86) (15.61) (14.26) (14.26) (20.93) (20.78) (14.69) (14.66) 
Constant 1.541*** 1.700*** 1.135 1.412 28.690*** 30.524*** 11.462** 15.516*** 
  (5.72) (6.24) (1.51) (1.96) (11.00) (11.91) (2.25) (2.98) 
Observations 3140 3063 1523 1519 3118 3040 1511 1507 
R-squared 0.38 0.38 0.44 0.44 0.28 0.28 0.34 0.34 
Robust t statistics in parentheses 
       * significant at 10% 
       ** significant at 5% 
       *** significant at 1% 
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               Table 12. Determinants of bank profitability during the pre-crisis using only active banks 2005-2007. 
  ROAA ROAE 
  Advanced Economies Emerging Economies Advanced Economies Emerging Economies 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Four firm concentration 0.552*** 
 
0.904* 
 
6.903*** 
 
0.387 
 
  (2.69) 
 
(1.68) 
 
(4.30) 
 
(0.13) 
 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
 
1.553*** 
 
1.206 
 
16.680*** 
 
6.825 
  
 
(3.09) 
 
(1.44) 
 
(4.31) 
 
(0.85) 
Market share 0.611 0.607 -1.897*** -1.790** 8.278** 10.126*** 2.107 -0.647 
  (1.44) (1.21) (2.59) (2.43) (2.14) (2.63) (0.61) (0.15) 
Overheads to total assets 13.984** 13.722** 95.166*** 95.530*** 119.576*** 110.893** 422.791*** 419.142*** 
  (2.50) (2.25) (6.58) (6.60) (2.70) (2.42) (10.26) (10.05) 
Interest rate spread -4.268*** -4.753*** 2.321 2.348 -32.575*** -37.398*** 3.430 3.290 
  (3.19) (3.47) (1.58) (1.59) (3.52) (3.98) (1.11) (1.06) 
Inflation -0.782 -4.428 -2.335 -2.407 -15.958 -55.781 14.294** 15.458** 
  (0.19) (0.97) (1.28) (1.32) (0.43) (1.41) (2.18) (2.32) 
Log bank assets -0.030 -0.032 0.237*** 0.232*** 0.223 0.155 0.570 0.751** 
  (1.52) (1.29) (3.21) (3.13) (1.53) (0.91) (1.61) (2.12) 
GDP growth 4.004 5.757* 8.183*** 8.758*** 48.877** 50.940** 39.655*** 39.654*** 
  (1.56) (1.78) (3.17) (3.35) (2.04) (2.10) (3.42) (3.39) 
Equity to total assets 0.085*** 0.089*** 0.119*** 0.119*** -0.316*** -0.290*** -0.436*** -0.426*** 
  (5.03) (4.92) (4.16) (4.17) (2.79) (2.70) (7.04) (7.01) 
Cost to income -0.034*** -0.036*** -0.098*** -0.097*** -0.307*** -0.307*** -0.521*** -0.521*** 
  (7.00) (6.84) (7.60) (7.55) (9.58) (9.11) (12.49) (12.23) 
Constant 2.294*** 2.604*** -1.152 -0.736 23.410*** 27.557*** 26.514*** 22.924*** 
  (4.24) (3.94) (0.75) (0.51) (5.91) (6.47) (3.54) (3.13) 
Observations 917 851 447 445 911 845 443 441 
R-squared 0.52 0.52 0.68 0.68 0.32 0.32 0.52 0.52 
Robust t statistics in parentheses 
       * significant at 10% 
       ** significant at 5% 
       *** significant at 1% 
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Table 13. Determinants of bank profitability during the financial crisis using only active banks 2008-2010. 
  ROAA ROAE 
  Advanced Economies Emerging Economies Advanced Economies Emerging Economies 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Four firm concentration -0.554* 
 
1.058* 
 
1.931 
 
19.752***   
  (1.67) 
 
(1.68) 
 
(0.76) 
 
(3.29)   
Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
 
-1.363 
 
2.066*** 
 
6.396 
 
26.448*** 
  
 
(1.58) 
 
(2.97) 
 
(1.08) 
 
(3.30) 
Market share 0.489 0.806 -1.584* -1.518** 1.892 3.665 -22.732*** -17.177** 
  (0.72) (1.26) (1.91) (2.10) (0.25) (0.49) (2.78) (2.30) 
Overheads to total assets 9.244* 9.114* 36.246*** 36.798*** 81.459*** 80.639*** 352.214*** 352.307*** 
  (1.71) (1.81) (5.27) (5.30) (2.92) (3.10) (5.47) (5.45) 
Interest rate spread -4.040*** -3.795*** 0.159 0.169 -36.343*** -35.751*** -0.665 -0.132 
  (2.84) (2.85) (0.28) (0.30) (3.03) (3.07) (0.16) (0.03) 
Inflation 3.955 -0.400 0.323 0.203 25.617 -9.545 2.086 0.510 
  (0.61) (0.07) (0.34) (0.21) (0.51) (0.21) (0.48) (0.12) 
Log bank assets -0.017 -0.034 0.214*** 0.219*** -0.749*** -0.842*** 2.321*** 2.130*** 
  (0.68) (1.53) (3.03) (3.22) (2.82) (3.44) (4.00) (3.70) 
GDP growth 3.579*** 2.578** 9.239*** 9.315*** 31.857*** 25.951** 85.863*** 84.947*** 
  (3.41) (2.47) (5.57) (5.66) (2.87) (2.24) (5.38) (5.36) 
Equity to total assets 0.051** 0.049* 0.009 0.010 -0.181* -0.204** -0.179** -0.182** 
  (1.98) (1.95) (0.44) (0.49) (1.92) (2.11) (2.33) (2.35) 
Cost to income -0.026*** -0.025*** -0.049*** -0.049*** -0.286*** -0.279*** -0.403*** -0.394*** 
  (6.77) (6.98) (7.03) (6.89) (8.35) (8.74) (6.78) (6.55) 
Constant 2.286*** 2.390*** -1.534 -1.264 36.377*** 38.212*** -25.541** -14.345 
  (3.17) (3.77) (0.93) (0.89) (6.80) (7.70) (2.04) (1.29) 
Observations 863 929 454 454 854 919 449 449 
R-squared 0.29 0.27 0.35 0.35 0.24 0.22 0.35 0.35 
Robust t statistics in parentheses 
       * significant at 10% 
       ** significant at 5% 
       *** significant at 1% 
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Table 14. Determinants of bank profitability during the post-crisis using only active banks 2010-2014. 
  ROAA ROAE 
  Advanced Economies Emerging Economies Advanced Economies Emerging Economies 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Four firm concentration -0.468 
 
-0.495 
 
-3.429 
 
-2.826   
  (1.59) 
 
(1.24) 
 
(1.03) 
 
(0.72)   
Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
 
-1.777* 
 
-0.580 
 
-16.120* 
 
-12.654 
  
 
(1.95) 
 
(0.73) 
 
(1.65) 
 
(1.63) 
Market share -0.703 -0.507 0.082 -0.128 -0.885 0.444 4.985 7.657 
  (0.81) (0.56) (0.13) (0.19) (0.09) (0.05) (0.73) (1.04) 
Overheads to total assets 5.460*** 5.476*** 10.379 10.746 49.848*** 47.943*** 15.226 13.771 
  (3.66) (3.55) (1.07) (1.11) (4.84) (4.66) (0.21) (0.19) 
Interest rate spread -3.110** -3.426** -2.317 -2.173 -24.206* -28.019** -21.478 -21.001* 
  (2.27) (2.44) (1.34) (1.25) (1.77) (2.03) (1.77) (1.74) 
Inflation -5.862 -7.422 -1.980 -2.133 -84.929* -96.350* -15.395 -18.363 
  (1.32) (1.55) (1.55) (1.64) (1.76) (1.90) (1.43) (1.63) 
Log bank assets -0.022 -0.026 0.087** 0.094** -0.813*** -0.817*** 0.737 0.599 
  (1.08) (1.12) (2.10) (2.05) (3.69) (3.54) (1.55) (1.13) 
GDP growth 6.147*** 6.325*** 4.515 4.816 99.606*** 105.530*** 44.966 48.393 
  (3.10) (3.21) (1.32) (1.37) (4.15) (4.41) (1.40) (1.47) 
Equity to total assets 0.065*** 0.065*** 0.044*** 0.043*** -0.063 -0.056 0.081 0.072 
  (4.62) (4.38) (5.25) (5.16) (0.67) (0.58) (1.12) (1.00) 
Cost to income -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.047*** -0.048*** -0.251*** -0.247*** -0.352*** -0.348*** 
  (10.08) (9.51) (8.81) (9.18) (12.51) (11.81) (6.89) (7.15) 
Constant 1.663*** 1.707*** 1.618** 1.290 36.525*** 36.444*** 14.126 16.019* 
  (3.25) (3.17) (2.13) (1.52) (7.20) (7.39) (1.64) (1.65) 
Observations 1252 1180 616 614 1249 1176 611 609 
R-squared 0.32 0.31 0.36 0.36 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.22 
Robust t statistics in parentheses 
       * significant at 10% 
       ** significant at 5% 
       *** significant at 1% 
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Table 15. Fixed effect with clustered standard errors 2005-2014. 
  ROAA ROAE 
  Advanced Economies Emerging Economies Advanced Economies Emerging Economies 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Four firm concentration 1.481***   1.768**   21.055***   17.735***   
  (3.02) 
 
(1.99) 
 
(4.48) 
 
(2.65)   
Herfindahl-Hirschman index   2.271** 
 
3.757** 
 
34.875*** 
 
30.609** 
    (1.97) 
 
(2.54) 
 
(3.07) 
 
(2.29) 
Market share -0.382 -0.292 3.629* 3.723** 22.661 23.365 40.303** 44.416** 
  (0.21) (0.15) (1.73) (1.99) (1.17) (1.12) (2.11) (2.52) 
Overheads to total assets 6.767 7.324 15.260** 14.865** 6.808 10.898 69.057 66.329 
  (1.46) (1.62) (2.48) (2.39) (0.27) (0.44) (1.56) (1.47) 
Interest rate spread 3.042** 3.777*** -1.204 -0.686 21.912 26.279* 42.962 48.858* 
  (2.26) (2.68) (0.36) (0.21) (1.63) (1.88) (1.62) (1.82) 
Inflation 5.534*** 7.472*** 1.637*** 1.585*** 48.183** 69.856*** 12.017*** 11.421*** 
  (3.08) (3.92) (2.64) (2.60) (2.40) (3.40) (3.05) (2.96) 
Log bank assets 0.069 0.053 -0.366*** -0.369*** 0.323 0.068 -2.464*** -2.708*** 
  (0.48) (0.37) (2.97) (3.21) (0.35) (0.07) (2.89) (3.37) 
GDP growth 6.404*** 6.543*** 5.047*** 5.091*** 76.688*** 77.823*** 46.431*** 47.650*** 
  (10.77) (10.21) (5.26) (5.27) (10.34) (10.06) (6.06) (6.28) 
Equity to total assets 0.062** 0.059** 0.115*** 0.110*** 0.087 0.069 -0.048 -0.097 
  (2.54) (2.42) (5.87) (6.02) (0.76) (0.61) (0.52) (0.96) 
Cost to income -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.316*** -0.317*** -0.391*** -0.391*** 
  (10.52) (10.48) (8.61) (8.57) (14.27) (14.35) (8.65) (8.55) 
Constant -0.527 0.287 6.281*** 6.943*** 6.167 17.923 49.837*** 60.725*** 
  (0.20) (0.11) (2.68) (3.47) (0.36) (1.07) (2.97) (4.14) 
Observations 4961 4829 2011 2006 4935 4803 1994 1989 
R-squared 0.29 0.29 0.41 0.41 0.29 0.29 0.32 0.32 
Robust t statistics in parentheses 
       * significant at 10% 
       ** significant at 5% 
       *** significant at 1% 
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Table 16.  Summary variables of interest 
        
  
Advanced Economies Emerging Economies 
ROAA ROAE ROAA ROAE 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
2005-2014 All banks Four firm concentration 0.273** 
 
3.755*** 
 
1.111*** 
 
8.806***   
  HHI 
 
0.147 
 
4.298 
 
1.914*** 
 
10.779*** 
  Market share -1.269** -1.097** 2.436 3.766 -0.854** -0.685* -1.587 1.802 
2005-2007 All banks Four firm concentration 0.400**   6.412***   1.342**   3.055   
  HHI 
 
0.659 
 
13.009*** 
 
1.780*** 
 
10.519** 
  Market share 0.602 0.721 11.451*** 14.076*** -2.102*** -1.986*** 3.184 0.145 
2008-2010 All banks Four firm concentration -0.878***   -3.368   1.195**   15.862***   
  HHI 
 
-2.347*** 
 
-6.726 
 
2.474*** 
 
22.030*** 
  Market share -0.147 0.170 0.509 2.730 -1.165 -1.194 -17.912* -13.571* 
2011-2014 All banks Four firm concentration -0.210   0.548   0.311   0.664   
  HHI 
 
-0.868 
 
-2.387 
 
0.963 
 
-1.741 
  Market share -0.696 -1.639 -6.977 -5.829 -0.913 -1.137* 1.150 2.075 
2005-2014 Only active banks Four firm concentration 0.297**   4.782***   0.778***   6.464***   
  HHI 
 
0.429 
 
7.613** 
 
1.340*** 
 
7.839** 
  Market share -0.122 0.070 3.690 5.878 -0.650* -0.580 -0.321 1.718 
2005-2007 Only active banks Four firm concentration 0.552***   6.903***   0.904*   0.387   
  HHI 
 
1.553*** 
 
16.680*** 
 
1.206 
 
6.825 
  Market share 0.611 0.607 8.278** 10.126*** -1.897*** -1.790** 2.107 -0.647 
2008-2010 Only active banks Four firm concentration -0.554*   1.931   1.058*   19.752***   
  HHI 
 
-1.363 
 
6.396 
 
2.066*** 
 
26.448*** 
  Market share 0.489 0.806 1.892 3.665 -1.584* -1.518** -22.73*** -17.177** 
2011-2014 Only active banks Four firm concentration -0.468   -3.429   -0.495   -2.826   
  HHI 
 
-1.777* 
 
-16.120* 
 
-0.580 
 
-12.654 
  Market share -0.703 -0.507 -0.885 0.444 0.082 -0.128 4.985 7.657 
Robust t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10% 
      
  
 ** significant at 5% 
        *** significant at 1% 
        
		 	 42	
Table 17.  Descriptive statistics of dataset in emerging economies. 
Emerging economies   Quantiles 
Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min .25 Mdn .75 Max 
ROAA 2938 1.39 3.31 -15.98 0.54 1.28 2.23 18.44 
ROAE 2937 8.98 16.16 -83.97 4.31 10.68 16.78 47.63 
Four Firm 3882 0.69 0.15 0.44 0.59 0.65 0.79 1 
HHI 3844 0.17 0.1 0.08 0.12 0.14 0.2 0.7 
Market share 2943 0.07 0.09 0 0.01 0.03 0.1 0.49 
Overheads to total assets 2934 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.28 
Interest rate spread 2273 0.04 0.03 -0.15 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.1 
Inflation 3786 0.05 0.06 -0.15 0.01 0.04 0.08 0.2 
Log bank assets 2945 15.01 1.67 10.94 13.8 15.08 16.26 18.35 
GDP growth 3819 0.04 0.04 -0.08 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.13 
Equity to total assets 2944 18.6 17.8 2.86 8.89 12.13 18.78 96.88 
 
Table 18.  Descriptive statistics of dataset in advanced economies. 
Advanced economies   Quantiles 
Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min .25 Mdn .75 Max 
ROAA 6807 0.78 2.18 -9.97 0.15 0.46 0.98 16.25 
ROAE 6803 6.05 13.79 -94.28 2.45 6.56 11.78 49.24 
Four Firm 9239 0.59 0.16 0.38 0.48 0.57 0.71 0.95 
HHI 9027 0.13 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.17 0.30 
Market share 6817 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.33 
Overheads to total assets 6798 0.04 0.08 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.66 
Interest rate spread 5416 0.04 0.03 -0.03 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.21 
Inflation 9176 0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 
Log bank assets 6818 16.17 2.20 10.52 14.63 16.19 17.60 21.39 
GDP growth 9152 0.01 0.02 -0.06 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.06 
Equity to total assets 6817 12.59 15.48 0.61 5.01 7.60 12.58 94.56 
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Table 19. Average market concentration and number of banks. 
Country Average four-firm concentration Nr. of banks 
Austria 54,60% 49 
Bahrain 67,32% 36 
Belgium 67,99% 33 
Bulgaria 75,15% 17 
Cyprus 92,72% 14 
Czech Republic 89,29% 14 
Denmark 74,18% 34 
Egypt 94,48% 7 
Estonia 97,23% 9 
Finland 85,56% 23 
France 51,14% 163 
Germany 47,40% 98 
Greece 95,10% 9 
Hungary 63,22% 20 
Ireland 76,75% 25 
Iran 89,85% 13 
Israel 79,53% 13 
Italy 63,17% 83 
Jordan 58,61% 14 
Kuwait 68,42% 29 
Latvia 66,52% 18 
Lebanon 60,98% 28 
Lithuania 95,51% 7 
Luxembourg 68,60% 27 
Malta 89,44% 8 
Netherlands 79,41% 57 
Oman 100,00% 3 
Poland 57,04% 23 
Portugal 68,88% 27 
Qatar 83,00% 13 
Romania 82,40% 12 
Saudi Arabia 58,29% 13 
Slovakia 84,16% 10 
Slovenia 78,81% 11 
Spain 69,42% 58 
Sweden 85,83% 37 
Syria 95,14% 5 
Turkey 51,78% 48 
UAE 58,51% 31 
United Kingdom 40,74% 189 
      
Average 74,15% 33 
 
